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Unconscious Influences on Discourses About Consciousness: 
Ideology, State-Specific Science and Unformulated Experience 
 
by David Edwards 
Discussions about consciousness are complicated by the fact that participants do not share a common 
underlying “ordinary” consciousness. Everyday experience is founded on what Teasdale calls implicational 
cognition, much of which is not verbally formulated.  An unacknowledged aspect of debate is individuals’ 
attempts to negotiate the expression of their unformulated experience.  This is further complicated by the way 
in which a discourse, based on particular ontological assumptions, exercises an ideological control which 
limits what underlying aspects of experience can be formulated at all.  Tart’s concept of state specific 
sciences provides a framework within which the role of unformulated experience can be acknowledged and 
taken into account.  Unless this is done, debates will be vitiated by participants engaging in ideological 
struggles and talking at cross-purposes. 
Introduction 
The difficulty in reaching consensual solutions to 
the conceptual problems around the relationship 
between mind and body and of the nature of 
consciousness can be explained, in part, in terms 
of the real technical problems involved.  
However, a full explanation calls for an 
examination of the process of discourse itself.  
Conversation and discourse analysts point out 
that talking about something is a complex kind of 
behaviour and in order to understand it we need 
to examine more than just the truth value of the 
contents of the discussion.  When people discuss 
something they are likely to be engaging in an 
invisible process of negotiation about the 
construction of experience, during which they do 
not usually acknowledge the way in which they 
subtly, or not so subtly, influence what is talked 
about, how it is talked about, and what is not 
talked about.  Moreover, participants in 
discussions about the nature of consciousness 
enter them not with a common consciousness, but 
with their own personal and heterogeneous 
modes of experiencing.  They unwittingly 
embark on a process of negotiating the 
expression of this experience, much of which is 
unformulated.  The presence of this 
unacknowledged factor vitiates debate. 
Repression and Unformulated Experience 
To what extent are we aware of the factors which 
motivate and shape our contributions to 
discussions and debates?  This question was 
raised and discussed throughout the nineteenth 
century and before (Whyte, 1962).  At the end of 
that century, Freud, Jung and Janet were not 
alone in documenting how individuals would 
often not know the underlying causes of their 
behaviours, and might incorrectly attribute them 
to entirely different causes. They documented in 
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detail the way in which certain ideas, impulses, 
images or emotions make a contribution to the 
ongoing processes of behaviour, but are 
defensively excluded from awareness (Edwards 
& Jacobs, 2003).  Thus Freud explored how a 
person might attribute a slip of the tongue to 
tiredness or mere chance, whereas in reality it 
was the result of an emotionally painful 
association whose meaning was not available to 
full awareness.  “A presentation which is not put 
into words ... remains thereafter in the 
Ucs.[unconscious] in a state of repression” 
(1915, p. 202), he wrote.  For Freud, then, an 
experience became fully conscious only when 
formulated in words to become the object of 
detached reflective awareness1.  
This is just the kind of reflective awareness 
which informs the discussions of human 
experience that this journal is devoted to.  We 
would like our debates to be a form of rational 
reflective activity, in which our contributions are 
not shaped by psychological factors of which we 
are unaware.  Conversation analysts warn us 
about the difficulty of achieving this goal. Billig 
(1999) argues that what Freud called repression 
and conceptualized as an intrapsychic process, 
can be better understood as an interpersonal 
process in which what is spoken about, how it is 
spoken about and the way matters are broached 
or avoided is continuously orchestrated in 
response to cues from the others with whom the 
conversation is taking place.  In conversation 
analysis, the influence of such complex rules can 
be detected in virtually every utterance.  
As Stern points out, even without the 
complication of defensive exclusion of material 
from awareness, the rendering of experience into 
                                                          
1  This is, as De Quincy (1999, p. 96) notes, a particular 
psychological use of the word “conscious” whose 
opposite is “unconscious” in the sense of out of 
awareness.  This is a different distinction from that 
between “conscious” = sentient, in contrast to “non-
conscious” = insentient. The psychological distinction 
between “conscious” and “unconscious” is itself used in 
several different ways, some aspects of which are 
touched on in the present paper. 
words is intrinsically problematic.  He cites 
something Sullivan had written in 1940: 
one has information about one’s 
experience only to the extent that one 
has tended to communicate it to 
another or thought about it in the 
manner of communicative speech.  
Much of what is ordinarily said to be 
repressed is merely unformulated 
(Stern, 1997, p. 185). 
This insight goes back to Adler (1938) who 
argued that much of what Freud called 
unconscious was not repressed but merely 
“withheld from the understanding” (p. 16).  In 
much of Freud’s writing, repression implies an 
active exclusion from awareness of something 
that has been formulated.  Adler and Sullivan 
recognized that our experience has dimensions 
and aspects that have never been formulated in 
words.  We are therefore not fully conscious of 
them, in the sense that we cannot communicate 
them to others in words or recognize them 
ourselves. 
The Formulation of Everyday Experience 
Stern (1997) investigates the way in which 
unformulated experience seeks to find expression 
and, in so doing, shapes an individual’s 
participation in discourse.  Experience becomes 
formulated during the process of social 
interaction only when certain conditions are met.  
Two important factors that determine this have 
already been alluded to.  The first is the presence 
of emotionally painful associations.  People will 
withdraw from formulating something which will 
give rise to emotional distress in themselves.  
The second is the actual and anticipated response 
of others participating in the interpersonal 
process, who effectively exercise a kind of 
ideological control over what may be said.  Child 
psychologists have long recommended that 
parents encourage children to articulate their 
feelings and concerns and to respond to them in a 
manner which is accepting and validating.  It is 
widely recognized that this kind of empathy lays 
a foundation for an articulate discourse of 
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experience and a coherent and strong sense of 
self.  This is a reciprocal interpersonal process 




invitation to formulate 
↓ 





Whether explicit or implicit, the invitation to 
formulate implies the supportive response that is 
to come.  It is not just a formal verbal invitation, 
but a genuine offer of a safe context in which to 
experiment with bringing the unspoken into 
words.  The supportive response includes non-
judgmental acceptance of the experience itself as 
a part of human life.  Many experiences never get 
put into words because this supportive context is 
absent.  Where attempts to formulate have been 
met with discouragement in the form of hostility, 
criticism, shaming or indifference, individuals 
give up trying to formulate or may perhaps seek 
other social contexts in which to do so. The 
supportive person who witnesses the formulation 
of the experience may do more than just affirm it.  
He/she may actively assist in the process.  This, 
of course, is what therapists try to do when they 
reflect or interpret emotions that are implicit in 
what the client is saying: “It sounds as if you feel 
guilty that you are so successful, while your 
dyslexic brother is struggling to make it in school 
at all.”  When therapists offer an accurate 
formulation, clients often experience an 
immediate recognition of its accuracy and feel 
great relief.  On occasions there might be quite an 
intense emotional response. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that we can only 
“have” those experiences which find this kind of 
interpersonal validation (Edwards & Jacobs, 
2003).  Browne (1990) captures some of the 
paradox in this with the term “unexperienced 
experience.”  He is discussing experiences of 
trauma that individuals cannot have because the 
people around them deny that the trauma 
occurred or cannot cope with the intense 
emotions that mention of the trauma evokes. In 
cases like this there are both elements of 
withdrawing from experiencing something 
associated with emotional pain and failing to 
formulate it in the first place because others are 
unable to tolerate and support the process of 
speaking truthfully about what has happened.  It 
is this particular combination for which the term 
dissociation is also used.  Dissociation, however, 
is not confined to severe trauma.  In everyday 
discourse, the invitation to formulate is 
negotiated in the moment to moment flux of 
conversation and is routinely not extended to 
aspects of experience that are ideologically 
prohibited or simply culturally unfamiliar: 
The ‘said’ and the ‘unsaid’ are 
intimately linked: to say one thing 
implies that other things are not being 
said.  If language provides the rhetorical 
skills for opening up lines of talk, then it 
also provides the skills for creating the 
unsaid. More than this, language 
provides the skills for closing down 
areas of talk (Billig, 1999, p. 52). 
 
The result of this process is a kind of routine 
dissociation, a division of consciousness in which 
significant aspects of our experience are not 
integrated into the conversational narratives 
about who and what we are. 
This kind of negotiation is a power struggle 
which is not confined to everyday conversations.  
It permeates much academic discourse too. In a 
paper in which he attacks formulations advanced 
by the philosopher, Searle, in support of a field 
theory of consciousness, Honderich (2001) 
employs an entertaining blend of the ebullient 
and the bullying, as he cajoles, humiliates, argues 
and persuades.  He humorously calls Searle the 
“king of American stand-up philosophers” (p. 62) 
- with the clear intention, of course, of knocking 
him down.  The paper is also full of cogent 
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argument.  But his evocative discourse is 
designed to roundly discourage anyone from 
joining the Searle team.  Field metaphors are 
dismissed as “homespun poetry” and he 
shamelessly heaps shame on anyone who might 
be drawn to a “unified field approach to 
consciousness,” or to “more or less literal talk of 
a conscious field,” or who would flirt with 
“Californian mystery-labs” (p. 66). His scurrilous 
insults include the suggestion that debate with 
such individuals is impossible, so “we [had] 
better all give up and go bird-watching” (p. 65).  
As he is writing in a journal devoted to the 
understanding of consciousness, most 
ornithologists are unlikely to read this insulting 
suggestion.  Probably he was not so much 
wanting to discredit ornithology as to transport 
himself in fantasy to a place not likely to be 
populated by field theorists, unaware that some 
theorists believe that a field theory is needed if 
we are to ever explain the remarkable long-
distance migration behaviour of many birds. 
Unformulated Experience and the Metaphor 
of Resonance 
Honderich’s paper illustrates a point which he 
chooses to ignore, which is that we are drawn to 
metaphors as much as to logical analysis to make 
sense of the consciousness conundrum, and the 
metaphors people are drawn to reflect underlying 
and unformulated aspects of their experience. 
While Honderich is not alone in being horrified 
by field metaphors, there are others who feel the 
opposite. For example, several psychologists 
explore the idea of an unconscious field (e.g. 
Edwards & Jacobs, 2003; Rucker & Lombardi, 
1998; Schwartz-Salant, 1995) - but that’s another 
debate which I won’t enter into in case 
Honderich tries to knock me down too.  Perhaps 
he will anyway, although I have been trying quite 
hard not to commit myself to any position at all 
on the matters he addresses.  However, I happily 
state the hypotheses which the present paper is 
arguing for: that the negotiation of the 
formulation of experience plays an important, but 
unacknowledged, role in debates about the nature 
of mind and consciousness, that such discourses 
are not just a process through which we develop 
an accurate propositional theory, that individuals 
involved in these debates seek formulations that 
are both rationally coherent and personally 
satisfying, and that, in the process they attempt to 
formulate their own unformulated experience, 
seek affirmation for formulations which resonate 
with their underlying experience and seek to 
discredit ones that don’t.   
The metaphor of resonance was used by Breuer 
(1895) to capture the way in which an event 
might activate a memory of an emotionally 
charged episode from the past and trigger an 
intense emotional reaction quite out of proportion 
to the current event itself (see Edwards & Jacobs, 
2003). Similarly the metaphor of resonance 
captures the ability of verbal formulations to 
capture the essence of various aspects of 
unformulated experience. We see this in the way 
theorists are attracted to theories and discourses 
which fit their own (formulated and 
unformulated) experience.  For example, De 
Quincy (1999) offers to “reveal his hand”, as he 
puts it, and describes how he was immediately 
attracted to Griffin’s  panexperientialism. 
I became a confirmed panpsychist 
when I first read Whitehead, and a 
reconfirmed panpsychist when I later 
read Griffin’s ... panexperientialism 
(1999, p. 92). 
 
He acknowledges that he was persuaded, not so 
much by the force and rationality of the 
argument, as by the experience that what 
Whitehead and Griffin were articulating rang true 
with his felt sense of how things really are.   We 
can detect a similar resonance in Isham’s (1994) 
response to an apparent chance encounter with 
Bohm’s Quantum theory which, while working 
in industry in electronics, he pulled down from a 
library shelf “almost at random”.   
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I ...  read it avidly for a week.  By the 
end of that time I had resolved to drop 
electronics in favour of theoretical 
physics ... a decision I have never 
regretted (p. 157). 
The encounter seems to have been about 
something more than mere aptitude for 
theoretical physics, and to have been a creative 
call from what Boss (1977, p. 26) termed his 
“existential possibilities”. The character of 
Isham’s review of Bohm and Hiley’s The 
Undivided Universe, supports the hypothesis that 
Isham found in the way Bohm wrote about 
physics, someone who was able to articulate and 
begin to address his [Isham’s] own unformulated 
questions and intuitions about the ultimate nature 
of things.  I had a similar response, years ago, to 
reading Grof’s (1976) Realms of the Human 
Unconscious, which presented his conclusions 
from work with LSD-assisted psychotherapy.  I 
had never taken psychedelic drugs myself or had 
spontaneous altered state experiences.  
Nevertheless, I had a strong sense that this is 
someone who has “got it,” someone with a 
quality of understanding that I could relate to in a 
far-reaching way.  This feeling was confirmed 
when, some ten years later, I had opportunities to 
attend some of Grof’s lectures and workshops. 
On subsequent occasions, when I encountered 
Grof I continued to have a strong and pervasive 
resonance with what he said, something I have 
experienced with few other people. 
Wilber (1982) also had an important resonance 
experience with a book. He describes himself as a 
student, as someone whose 
true passion ... was for science.  I 
fashioned a self that was built on logic, 
structured by physics and moved by 
chemistry ... my mental youth was an 
idyll of precision and accuracy, a 
fortress of the clear and evident (p. 58). 
 
In his first year of college, he picked up a copy of 
the Tao-te Ching and was exposed to a drastically 
different view of the world to anything he had 
known so far, and how 
those ancient words of Lao Tsu took me 
quite by surprise; worse, the surprise 
refused to wear off ....  Within a period 
of a few months, the meaning of my life 
as I had known it, simply began to 
disappear (p, 58). 
A phrase that is sometimes used to refer to 
experiences like this, is that the words “caught 
his imagination.”  Following Stern, we might 
hypothesise that the words fitted with important 
parts of Wilber’s experience which were as yet 
unformulated, and that his reading of them, and 
his subsequent exploration of related texts, 
enabled this previously hidden aspect of his 
experience to find words and form. 
The Interaction of Propositional and 
Implicational Cognitive Modes 
These observations point to the existence of two 
fundamental cognitive modes, the one in which 
logic prevails, the other which lends itself to 
analogy and metaphor. Freud was a master of 
both, but some of his formal theorising is vitiated 
by attempts to be overly formal in domains where 
metaphors are more appropriate (Edwards & 
Jacobs, 2003).  Merleau-Ponty makes the 
distinction using the phrases “empirical speech” 
(for discourse that emphasises rationality, reality 
testing, and propositional accuracy) and “creative 
speech” (for discourse that invites the process of 
bringing new meanings into verbal formulation). 
Langs (1996) makes the same distinction using 
the terms “theoretic” and “mythic” (see Edwards, 
2003).  As Stern (1997) observes, the mythic or 
creative mode is often referred to as the exercise 
of “imagination”.  Cognitive science also gives a 
central place to this distinction. In Teasdale’s 
(1993, 1996, 1997) Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems (ICS) Theory, an implicational 
system represents meaning at a more holistic and 
generic level.  It captures very general 
regularities that have been detected and 
represents them as broad frameworks of 
meaning, schematic models within which 
different kinds of experience are summarized and 
organized. In parallel with it is a propositional 
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system that represents reality in terms of discrete 
concepts with specific meanings and rules of 
assignment.  Words refer directly to things 
according to demarcated rules.  Propositions refer 
to reality in a similar rule-bound manner and are 
subject to logical rules of verification.   
Each modality has a different relationship to 
language. Especially in the technical discourses 
of academic disciplines, language is based on 
definitions and distinctions which enable words 
and propositions to be linked directly to facts 
about the world.  Implicational code does not 
map so directly on to language.  Teasdale points 
out that often we resort to metaphor or even 
poetry in order to communicate it.  Sometimes 
what cannot be rendered in language at all can 
find formulation in the expressive arts - When 
Words are not Enough is the subtitle of a recent 
book on expressive arts therapy (Levy, 1995).  
Language, therefore, can have two very different 
faces.  With the first, it is seen as 
a mirror of nature, a means for 
representing what is real ... [something 
that obeys] human command with the 
same absence of resistance or will 
demonstrated by a screwdriver or a 
knife and fork.   
 
With the second, by contrast, it is engaged with 
giving voice to unformulated implicational 
experience, and 
language uses us; we have become the 
utensils.  Language is no longer our 
tool, but the very crucible of our 
experience (Stern, 1997, p. 9). 
In the moment to moment sharing and 
construction of experience through everyday 
conversation, each of these two cognitive 
systems can contribute in complementary ways. 
Of course, not all conversation is either strongly 
propositionally oriented or focused on giving 
birth to meaning.  Sometimes it is relatively 
trivial and “reveals only what we already know” 
(Stern, 1997, p. 90).  However, at times the focus 
is on finding expression for underlying 
implicational meanings which may be more felt 
than formulated.  At others there is a deliberate 
engagement with rationality and propositional 
accuracy. At times conversation may shift from 
one focus to another.  At times different 
participants may speak at cross-purposes, failing 
to recognize the complementary roles of the two 
kinds of language use. A disjunction between the 
propositional domain and implicational 
experience is also common within the experience 
of a single individual. Something that appears to 
be accurate propositionally may fail to fit with 
implicational meaning.  When this disjunction 
occurs we find people saying things like, “I know 
it intellectually, but I don’t believe it 
emotionally” or “my head says this but my heart 
says that.”  
Another complicating factor is that our 
underlying experience is not fixed or static, it 
flows and unfolds. What has been formulated 
today may no longer be entirely accurate 
tomorrow.   As language connects with this 
flowing and unfolding, it engages ever freshly 
with emergent meanings.   Gendlin (1999, p. 
235) has provided a particularly clear account of 
the phenomenology of this creative process, 
which, he remarks, is characterized by 
“uncategorizable intricacies.”   He illustrates it 
with a fine example from a psychotherapy 
session in which a woman is grappling with her 
sexuality and her search for spiritual 
energization.  There is an implicit guilt that the 
experience of energization is largely sexual, but 
then a moment of insight that she is afraid that if 
she lets the energization go beyond being sexual 
she will lose it altogether.  This is the point at 
which she starts to weep, as if she had never 
before seen the role of fear in keeping her stuck.  
When this kind of formulation works, there is the 
accompanying sense of recognition that the 
words do justice to the underlying experience.  
Above we used the metaphor of resonance for 
this kind of experience.  Gendlin (1996) has 
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described training in focussing in which 
individuals are taught how to put a word to a felt 
sense and test for this kind of resonant accuracy. 
In qualitative research in psychology, this 
matching of words to experience has been called 
phenomenological validity.  For example, a 
researcher may interview someone, and then 
summarize and organize the material in the form 
of a coherent narrative or thematic analysis.  The 
question arises as to how accurately this presents 
the material of the interview, and more 
importantly, the actual experience of the 
interviewee.  If there is phenomenological 
validity, the interviewee will say something like 
the participant in one of my own case studies 
(Edwards, 1996, p. 119): 
You are saying many of the things that I 
would like to say and it all resonates 
well - very well. 
 
Phenomenological validity, therefore, concerns 
whether there is a fit between verbal formulation 
and implicational meaning.   
This does not, of course, mean that the 
implicational meanings are necessarily accurate 
reflections of reality.  The central point of 
Breuer’s (1895) classic contribution already 
referred to is that perception of the present may 
be significantly distorted by resonance with 
memories of the past.  Teasdale’s papers all 
address the challenge of finding ways to change 
implicational meanings which are inaccurate and 
dysfunctional and which, having been evoked by 
such resonance, interfere with effective 
functioning.  Once implicational meaning has 
been formulated, it needs to be reflected on and 
its significance worked out in terms of the 
consensual realities of everyday life using the 
rules of propositional code.  This is the focus of a 
great deal of activity within psychotherapy. 
Unformulated Experience and State-Specific 
Science 
Experiences of recognition and resonance occur 
when we encounter words which render 
conscious for us dimensions of experience which 
are significant but as yet unformulated. Such as 
yet unformulated experience will deeply 
influence our contributions to philosophical 
debates about consciousness.  We ignore this 
when we assume that all adult participants in a 
scientific or philosophical investigation bring the 
same cognitive toolkit to bear.  Although we 
recognize that participants differ in terms of 
intelligence or training, this is not believed to be 
particularly relevant to participation, so long as 
one has the requisite background and can follow 
the argument.  As Cardeňa, Lynn and Krippner 
(2000, p. 16) remind us, “The strong normative 
impact of language and social conventions may 
deceive us into believing that we are more alike 
than we really are”.  Aldous Huxley recognized 
that individuals have distinctive experiential 
modes, which he referred to with the term 
“being”: 
Knowledge is a function of being.  
When there is a change in the being of 
the knower, there is a corresponding 
change in the nature and amount of 
knowing (Huxley, 1974, p. 1). 
 
The implication is that individuals can differ 
markedly with regard to ways of being and 
knowing, and, as a consequence, in their 
understanding of whatever may be being 
discussed.  
Huxley also implies that one’s mode of being and 
knowing can change with the result that one’s 
perspective will change too. This is illustrated in 
Walsh’s (1984) biographical account of personal 
changes that were unexpectedly initiated by his 
psychotherapy with James Bugental, a process 
which he entered because it was a formal 
requirement of his training as a psychiatrist.  
Walsh began to have insights into the way 
automatic cognitive and emotional activity 
constructs the everyday experience we call 
reality.  This, combined with his own aptitude for 
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this kind of self-exploration, led him to engage in 
some intensive meditation retreats, and he found 
his experience becoming so drastically 
transformed that he could write,  
One after another, my most ... stable, 
sensible, ... taken for granted, and 
culturally shared beliefs have been 
shattered .... I don’t know ... how correct 
my currently cherished set of beliefs, 
assumptions and world views are .... I 
do feel that I know that I have been 
wrong, that I’ve underestimated the 
mind, consciousness, us, the extent to 
which we are asleep, sleepwalking, 
trapped in our individual and shared 
cultural illusions (p. 31). 
 
Walsh shows how what may feel like a certain 
and fixed way of experiencing the world can 
deconstruct itself and give way to a quite 
different mode of experiencing.  Rather than 
happening once, Walsh reports how this 
deconstruction became an ongoing process of 
what Huxley would have referred to as a “change 
in the being of the knower” which resulted, in 
turn, in a series of alterations of “the nature and 
amount of knowing”. 
Tart (1972) addresses this phenomenon through 
the concept of state-specific sciences.  He 
supposes that our everyday mode of experience, 
our ordinary state of consciousness, is not the 
only one that is possible or meaningful.  It is of 
course, very useful as it has been selected 
through evolution as a mode which enables 
survival in a world which poses continual 
challenges to an individual’s practical 
resourcefulness. However, humans are capable of 
entering and stabilising other “altered” states of 
consciousness.  This can be achieved through 
training of various kinds, for example shamanic 
training (Krippner, 2000) or meditation (Claxton, 
1996), or by taking psychedelic drugs. It can also 
occur in spontaneous mystical experiences 
(Wulff, 2000) and in the kinds of processes that 
Grof and Grof (1989) call “spiritual emergence.”  
The term “altered states” puts the focus on modes 
of experiencing which are markedly different 
from our everyday consciousness.  However, 
even “everyday consciousness” is not a unitary 
mode of experiencing.  We can think of each 
person’s everyday mode of experiencing as being 
like a complex lens built up in layers.  Only the 
outer layers are visible and formulated. The 
deeper layers, invisible and unformulated, shape 
how they experience what is said and what they 
express in response.  One example of a 
distinctive mode of everyday experiencing is 
sometimes encountered by psychotherapists.  A 
client dreams of being a robot or a zombie. This 
is often an expression of an, as yet unformulated, 
experience of life as automated and meaningless, 
and talking about the dream may help the client 
identify a sense of life being mechanical, 
predictable, lacking feeling, heart or soul.  Such 
states usually point to an underlying 
fragmentation, as if the individual has distanced 
him/herself from possibilities for experiencing in 
an organic and enlivened way.  There have long 
been discussions among philosophers about 
whether a machine could be designed that 
mimicked human consciousness, or whether there 
are ingredients to human experience which would 
inevitably be missing from a robot, however 
sophisticated. A great deal of attention was 
devoted to these questions in the first two 
volumes of the newly founded Journal of 
Consciousness Studies around the question of 
whether conscious human beings could be 
distinguished from zombies who behave like 
humans but whose responses are purely 
mechanical (Dennett, 1995; Moody, 1994; Tart, 
1995). From the perspective being advanced 
here, individuals who dream of robots or zombies 
might be expected to be more sympathetic to the 
view that consciousness is a mere 
epiphenomenon, an insignificant by-product of 
brain complexity, and less inclined to theories 
which give consciousness a unique and active 
role in human life. 
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Furthermore, the same person can alternate 
between different modes of experiencing 
according to what they are engaged with.  A 
colleague working on a technical article on the 
neuropsychology of brain injuries remarked how 
she was finding her weekly art classes to be an 
unwelcome interruption.  Yet at other times she 
greatly welcomes the classes which allow her to 
experience and express a different and creative 
side of her nature.  She needs to be in a different 
mode for each of the two activities and it takes 
effort to switch from “writing scientific paper” 
mode to “art class” mode.  We encounter a 
different mode of everyday consciousness if we 
ask artists to talk about their experience when 
working.  They will often describe a state which 
is quite “altered” compared to that in which most 
of us operate most of the time and speak of 
having to make a significant adjustment when 
they want to focus on mundane activities. 
It is also possible to bracket experience in one 
mode while one is in the other.  The scientist who 
is moved by a symphony concert may or may not 
see a need to make sense of this experience when 
engaging in scientific discussion.  However, this 
kind of separation of modes of experiencing can 
result in what Freud called disavowal (Goldberg, 
1999). Consciousness is divided so that in one 
mode of experiencing, the implications of the 
other are effectively denied.  At times this may 
be practically useful.  At others it is the basis of 
psychopathology.  Can it make any sense in 
consciousness studies to systematically exclude 
from debate the implications of any mode of 
experiencing?   Western science can be termed a 
unistate discipline (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). It 
recognizes only one specialized epistemological 
mode, sees no value in these kinds of altered 
states and tends to dismiss them as aberrations.  
This can be contrasted with a multistate view of 
science which recognizes that there is not one 
unique mode of consciousness which is the sole 
route to valid knowledge.  Other modes, such as 
those referred to above, may disclose reality in 
ways which complement the way it is disclosed 
in ordinary states of consciousness.  Those who 
enter them may gain insights and acquire 
perspectives which they could not otherwise 
reach.  By putting together views of the world 
from different states, we can obtain a more 
complete and comprehensive understanding than 
could be gained from any single state. 
In terms of the concept of state-specific science, 
the kind of experience you can address and the 
kind of knowledge you can construct out of it, 
depends on the states of consciousness you are 
familiar with. There is no absolute kind of 
knowledge, only knowledge that is disclosed by 
particular states of consciousness, states which 
furnish different modes of knowing the world. 
This means that a group of individuals cannot 
engage in a coherent discourse unless they have 
experienced the same basic state and are all 
articulating their experience of that state.  This 
means that debates in science, philosophy and 
psychology are shaped as much by the unstated 
assumptions implicit in modes of experiencing as 
they are by the logic of the arguments that are 
employed.  Yet there is no easy route to 
identifying these unstated assumptions.  Even 
where we deal with more obviously “altered” 
states, the situation is no less complicated since 
there is not just one altered or shamanic or 
meditative state which is achieved by different 
spiritual or consciousness altering practices.  
Wilber (1981) has provided a map of the kinds of 
states of consciousness that have been widely 
described in the literature of the world’s spiritual 
traditions.  However, Walsh (1993) has pointed 
out that the development of psychological 
concepts for addressing this complexity of states 
is still very much in its infancy.  It is very easy 
therefore for people to be at cross-purposes 
because in their interaction they are articulating 
experience from different modes of 
consciousness. 
Western Science and the Ideological Control 
of Consciousness 
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It is often argued that philosophy or science must 
be rooted firmly in the propositional use of 
language and that there is little role for other 
modes of consciousness.  Western science can be 
understood as a comprehensive articulation of a 
specialized epistemological mode grounded in 
propositional code. The discourses and rituals of 
practitioners of shamanism (Krippner, 2000) or 
esoteric spiritual paths (Versluis, 2000) can be 
understood as instrumental in shaping and 
stabilizing a specialized mode of consciousness 
suited to the goals of these practices. In the same 
way, the practitioners of science also engage in 
practices which are designed to stabilize a 
specialized mode of consciousness, although the 
nature of the mode of consciousness is, of course, 
very different.  Thus the practice of science 
includes the rehearsal, implicitly or explicitly, of 
ideological positions regarding assumptions 
about ontology (what kinds of things exist or are 
real?), methodology (how can we, in practice, 
advance knowledge?) and epistemology (how can 
we ensure the validity of the knowledge we 
acquire?).  For many, there is an ideological 
commitment to:  (1) the ontological principle that 
only matter exists and that everything (including 
consciousness) must be somehow derived from 
that; (2) the methodological principle that only 
the objectively observable can be studied and it 
must be studied in such a way that others can 
observe or replicate; (3) the epistemological 
principle that knowledge must be verifiable, 
falsifiable and testable according to the 
assumptions of the methodology.  These 
assumptions govern a set of discourses which 
entrench the privileging of a particular mode of 
consciousness as the only route to valid 
knowledge.  Explicitly and implicitly, detailed 
instructions are provided for cultivating and 
maintaining it, a process which exercises 
ideological control over the consciousness of its 
practitioners.  
Conversation and discourse analysts would argue 
that in practice no discourse can be purified of 
the agendas of its opinion leaders and the power 
struggles in which it is socially embedded.  
Power plays often masquerade as arguments, and 
rational argument is apt to be spiced with more or 
less heavy doses of invitation, rhetoric, and 
persuasion.  Just as the course of an everyday 
conversation is shaped by the hidden agendas of 
the participants, so are the discourses and 
practices of science.  As Keller and Longino 
(1998, p. 1) observe,  
Scientific observation is never innocent 
... but always and inevitably influenced 
by theoretical commitments. 
 
This state of affairs is the outcome of a historical 
process in which advocates of different 
epistemological modes have struggled for 
supremacy.  Feminist critics like Keller (1985) 
have documented some of this process in the 
laying of the foundations of science in the 
seventeenth century.  For example, she visits 
heated debates in the Royal Society between 
proponents of the vision of Francis Bacon on the 
one hand and, on the other, those who were 
influenced by Paracelsus and Hermetic 
philosophy.  She particularly draws attention to a 
predominance in Baconian discourse of 
metaphors which spoke of masculine aggression 
towards the natural world aimed at domination 
and assertion of control.  For example: 
Henry Oldenberg, Secretary of the 
Royal Society, announced ... that the 
intention of that society was “to raise a 
Masculine Philosophy ... whereby the 
Mind of Man may be ennobled with 
Solid Truths” (Keller, 1985, p. 52). 
 
For Keller, the predominant mode of knowing in 
science is a largely masculine one which 
emphasises detachment and objectivity at the 
expense of intuition and holistic engagement.  
The stronger the commitment to an ideological 
position, the greater is the willingness to forgo 
one’s personal experience as a guide to 
understanding.  This means that ideological 
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commitments lead apparently rational 
investigators to selectively focus on information 
that supports their positions and inaccurately 
interpret data that might contradict them. These 
ideological commitments may arise from a 
particular mode of experiencing, or they may 
entrench it, but either way they contribute to an 
inhibition of the formulation of any experiences 
that cannot be fitted into consensually negotiated 
categories. This explains why some philosophical 
problems have remained intractable for centuries.  
The intensity of ideological struggle that 
accompanies them frequently calls forth the 
metaphor of warfare. For example, an editorial in 
the Journal of Consciousness Studies that 
addressed these kinds of issues was entitled, 
“Another front in the science wars?”(Editorial, 
2001, p. 3).  
It is to just this sort of ideological conflict that 
Gray (1995, p. 5) refers when he points out how 
hard it has been historically 
to get the conscious part of our 
existence, which is the most important 
part of our existence, into the scientific 
framework which that very conscious 
existence has allowed us to build in the 
first place.  
 
As a distinguished neuroscientist himself, he is 
talking from first hand experience when he 
speaks of how,  
in the general scientific and 
philosophical community there have 
been enormous efforts to resist seeing 
that there is a problem, and these 
efforts continue today. 
 
The experience of Roger Sperry, another 
distinguished neuroscientist with nearly half a 
century of mainstream research under his belt, 
provides another illustration of the power of 
ideological pressure to actively discourage 
certain kinds of formulation of experience.  He 
describes how, in moving from a view of the 
cosmos as “strictly physical, value empty, and 
mindless” to a holistic perspective which 
acknowledges consciousness and values, “one 
puts much more of one’s personal self ‘on the 
line,’” and he remarks how many of his 
colleagues would tell him, “Quit wasting your 
time!  Get back to science!” (Sperry, 1995, p. 
506).  
Another episode that illustrates the intensity that 
this ideological conflict can generate is the 
controversy which greeted Rupert Sheldrake’s A 
New Science of Life when it was published in 
1981.  Contributions to this often acrimonious 
debate were collected as an appendix to a later 
edition of the book (Sheldrake, 1985).  In the 
prestigious Nature, an anonymous reviewer 
referred to it as an “infuriating tract ... [which is] 
... the best candidate for book burning there has 
been for many years” (Sheldrake, 1985, jacket). 
These comments were not tongue in cheek, and 
the metaphor reveals the intensity of feeling 
which is evoked in some quarters when any 
research or theory is discussed which supports 
the idea that so-called paranormal phenomena 
occur, or indeed might be quite normal.  The 
review was full of disdainful comments about 
“the motley crew of creationists, anti-
reductionists, neo-Lamarckians and the rest,” and 
contemptuous dismissal of anyone who might 
take Sheldrake seriously. Such blatant power 
tactics are, of course, not officially part of the 
scientific method.  As one respondent remarked 
(p. 223), “does this mean that Nature has 
abandoned the scientific method whereby ideas 
are launched upon the world to be tested by the 
scientific community?”  Turning the book-
burning metaphor back on the author, another 
remarked that he had used the journal as “a pulpit 
from which to denounce scientific heresies” and 
commented wittily, “after seeing the disastrous 
effect Sheldrake’s book has wrought upon the 
detachment ... of one with the responsibilities of 
the editorship of Nature, I shudder to contemplate 
the effect upon the ordinary man” (p. 225). 
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Bem and Honorton (1994) discuss their own 
experience of this kind of ideological pressure 
with reference to occasions on which they had 
discussed the possibility that “one or more of the 
more radical models of reality compatible with 
both quantum mechanics and psi [paranormal 
phenomena] will eventually come to be 
accepted.”  However, “we have learned,” they 
remark, “that all such talk provokes most of our 
colleagues ... to roll their eyes and gnash their 
teeth” (p. 16).  This metaphor also points to the 
fact that when the core of a paradigm is 
threatened its adherents are wont to respond 
irrationally, and in this irrational state they are 
likely to abandon their rational principles.  
Similarly, Child (1985) discussed how research 
on extra-sensory perception in dreams was 
treated by the psychological community.  First he 
notes that, although the experimental designs 
were state of the art, the mainstream journals 
which would have enabled the researchers to 
communicate with other psychologists did not 
publish any of the studies.  Second, he shows 
how other psychologists, in reviewing the field, 
selectively ignored or misrepresented important 
aspects of the procedure and findings. 
The Promise of a Multistate Paradigm 
A multistate perspective offers a route towards a 
resolution of some of these ideological conflicts. 
It recognizes the methodology and epistemology 
of Western science as a powerful and effective 
way of knowing and supports the rigour of the 
formulation of its principles and practice.  
However, rather than privileging it as the only or 
a superior way of knowing,  it recognizes other 
ways of knowing which are based on different 
principles and which call for different kinds of 
practice.  It would also look for the same kind of 
rigour in the work of exponents of other ways of 
knowing with regard to the clarification of the 
practices and epistemological principles by 
which they operate. 
Let us bring this perspective to bear on Versluis’ 
(2000) discussion of the writings of the Western 
esoteric spiritual traditions. Very often, he 
suggests, they are “the writings of someone who 
has actually realized the tradition’s aim of 
spiritual illumination” (p. 26) and which offer an 
authoritative account of the phenomenology of 
the experience.  Versluis suggests that they differ 
in character from the kinds of discourses in 
which Western scholars usually engage.  
However, this is not altogether true.  Scientific 
writings are also written by individuals who have 
realized the ideal of the kind of consciousness 
that is aspired to, although it is not a 
consciousness for which the phrase “spiritual 
illumination” would often be used.  Versluis also 
points out that their aim is not simply descriptive.  
They serve as a vehicle for the transformation of 
the consciousness of the reader.  He writes of 
Milosz’ poetry that it “is intended not only to 
describe, but also to evoke the kinds of 
consciousness it represents” (p. 27).  Again this is 
true of scientific writings.  They also serve to 
suggest, model, invite and even prescribe a 
distinctive mode of experience.  What is 
different, of course, is the nature of the 
experience.  Versluis (2000, p. 28) tells us that 
Böhme “warned his readers not to read his works 
unless they are attuned to them.”  This is because 
esoteric writings appeal to the unformulated 
experience of the reader and will convey their 
meaning accurately only when the reader has an 
experiential resonance with them, at some level.  
We saw an example of this in Wilber’s response 
to the Tao-te Ching.   But this kind of recognition 
is by no means confined to spiritual texts - people 
have been inspired in the same way by statements 
of the scientific perspective. 
Versluis commented on the difficulty faced by 
someone schooled in contemporary Western 
secularism of appreciating the perspectives of the 
Western esoteric traditions, since 
the secular modern world emerged 
through the jettisoning, suppression of 
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ignoring of most of these esoteric 
currents” (p. 31).  
Several aspects of this process have been 
examined above.  However, the interest in 
spiritual practice which has characterized 
Western societies during the past forty years or 
so reflects how individuals brought up with the 
experience of Western secularism have been 
actively seeking alternative ways of 
experiencing.  Since many of these individuals 
are philosophers, psychologists, medical doctors 
and scientists, there is a significant number of 
educated individuals who are experientially 
prepared to engage meaningfully with these texts. 
The approach of state-specific science provides a 
way of appreciating these as valid human 
experiences which complement the findings of 
the traditional scientific literature. 
The idea of state-specific knowing is central to 
understanding the shamanic traditions.  All over 
the world, these incorporate “technologies of the 
sacred,” methods of entering “shamanic states of 
consciousness” which enable the world to be 
experienced in radically different ways 
(Krippner, 2000).  These allow the shaman to 
know things that most people do not know, and 
more important, to put this specialist knowledge 
to use for the benefit of the communities in 
which they live, for example, by using it as a 
basis for healing practices.  By sharing these 
consciousness altering practices and discussing 
with each other what they experience, shamanic 
practitioners develop their own discourses and 
consensual understandings of consciousness, 
reality and the place of human life within it.  
Shaman healers appeal to assumptions very 
different from those of Western science 
(Krippner, 2000).  Ontologically they will 
probably not share the materialist assumption.  
Instead, they might claim that only consciousness 
exists and that the material world is derived from 
it for example, or they might hold that there are 
two ontological realms, spirit and matter. 
Methodologically, they would hold that progress 
and advancement of knowledge is not possible 
without learning to alter consciousness by the 
ritual use of intensive techniques such as prayer, 
meditation, trance dancing, drumming or using 
psychedelic substances. They would point out 
that the suggestion that one should eliminate the 
subjective as far as possible would make the 
advancement of this kind of knowledge 
impossible.  Epistemologically, they would agree 
that knowledge has to be consensually verified 
and they would point to different means of 
verification, for example by finding 
correspondences in traditional teaching, sacred 
texts and in the experiences of others who have 
achieved the same kinds of alterations of 
consciousness.  In countries like South Africa, 
where there is an active shamanistic tradition, 
this is not just an academic debate.  How it is 
handled will determine the working relations 
between traditional and Western healers in the 
health services.  It is impossible to offer any 
meaningful integration of shamanistic ideas and 
Western medicine within a unistate paradigm. 
However a multistate paradigm provides a basis 
for understanding and respecting both.  
Another area in which the state-specific science 
perspectives offers a unifying vision is the 
understanding of altered states of consciousness 
induced by psychedelic drugs.  Consider this 
account of an altered state experience of a 
psychiatrist described by Grof (1998, p. 28): 
... my only reality was a mass of 
swirling energy of immense proportions 
that seemed to contain all of Existence 
in an entirely abstract form .... It 
seemed to be pure consciousness, 
intelligence, and creative energy, 
transcending all polarities.  It was 
infinite and finite, divine and demonic, 
terrifying and ecstatic, creative and 
destructive .... I had no concept, no 
categories for what I was witnessing.  I 
could not maintain the sense of 
separate existence in the face of such a 
force.  My ordinary identity was 
shattered and dissolved: I became one 
with the Source.  Time lost any 
meaning whatsoever. 
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As Wulff (2000) observes, one has the choice of 
approaching an experience like this from one of 
two diametrically opposite approaches.  From a 
normative science perspective, individuals who 
study these states should remain “outsiders,” and 
should not themselves experiment with 
psychedelics because this would bias their 
judgement.   From a multistate perspective, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
understand an experience like this unless one was 
an “insider” who had had a similar experience 
oneself.  From the unistate science perspective, 
Grof’s experience, as an “insider”, risks  
... the loss, not only of the minimal 
critical distance that disinterested 
scholarly analysis requires but also of 
one’s credibility ... in the eyes of many 
outsiders (Wulff, 2000, p. 428).  
 
However, from a multistate perspective, by 
“working as an outsider” the scientist’s 
“pronouncements are likely to be viewed by 
insiders as uncomprehending or irrelevant” 
(Wulff, 2000, p. 428). 
At stake is the central question as to whether 
these experiences can be noetic, that is, whether 
they can have ontological implications (Edwards 
& Jacobs, 2003; Wulff, 2000). From a unistate 
perspective the answer is, of course, “No!”  The 
main basis of this answer is the epistemological 
assumption that knowledge can only be obtained 
and verified in a state of detached “ordinary” 
consciousness.  This means that drug induced 
states can never be more than interesting 
hallucinations.  If several individuals have the 
same kind of experience, this does not provide 
evidence that there is some common reality that 
has been encountered.  It can better be attributed 
to commonalities in the aberrations of brain 
chemistry induced by taking the drug. From a 
multistate perspective, where similar experiences 
are described repeatedly, the alternative 
hypothesis, that something real is being 
disclosed, needs at least to be kept on the table 
and investigated.  The claim is not, of course, that 
an understanding of the implications of such 
experiences needs to be developed while in an 
altered state.  Reflection, insight and theory 
development call for a balanced and careful 
stance of the same kind that is needed for 
reflecting on the results of scientific experiments.  
However, as we have seen, such experiences are 
likely to bring about a significant “change in the 
being of the knower” to use Huxley’s phrase, so 
that the experience brings to the debate a very 
different underlying experience which may be 
largely unformulated or only partly formulated.  
Within the scientific paradigm, there is the 
concern that those who claim that their 
experiences in altered states are noetic have 
simply lost their detachment and objectivity.  
There is doubt that individuals can 
maintain a posture of disinterested 
agnosticism in the face of the 
overwhelming impressions of reality 
that are characteristic of such 
experiences (Wulff, 2000, p. 428). 
 
From a multistate perspective, hidden in the 
scientist’s emphasis on “disinterested 
agnosticism” is a commitment to specific 
ontological assumptions which, as Harman 
(1988, p. 14) remarks, are themselves “a cultural 
artifact of Western society.”  The scientist is 
anything but disinterested or agnostic. 
The multistate perspective also throws light on 
one of the issues discussed in the “science wars” 
editorial in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 
referred to above. This is the creation and 
maintenance of the “unbridgeable gulf between 
science and the arts” (Editorial, 2001, p. 3).  
Different disciplines attract individuals whose 
mode of experiencing resonates with that 
dominant mode of experiencing of the discipline.  
Keller (1998, p. 37) observes that “scientists are 
... selected by the appeal of particular 
(stereotypic) images of science.“  We can expect 
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that this is equally true of practitioners in the arts 
and humanities.  In turn, within each discipline, 
particular modes of experiencing are cultivated 
and even prescribed.  If people from different 
disciplines fail to take account of the fact that 
their experience and conclusions are founded on 
a different articulation of consciousness, it would 
hardly be surprising if they fail to understand 
each other.  A multistate perspective offers an 
optimistic response to the “the general question 
of whether insights from science and humanities 
can be integrated, or at least be allowed to 
peacefully co-exist” (Editorial, 2001, p. 3).  It 
provides a framework within which to understand 
how a practitioner in the humanities cultivates 
and articulates a particular kind of 
epistemological mode which makes certain kinds 
of knowledge possible, and that a scientist does 
the same. A recognition that knowledge gained in 
the two epistemological modes is 
complementary, not contradictory, provides a 
foundation for mutual respect between 
disciplines.  
This in turn can resolve some of the conflicts 
found in disciplines which bridge the domains of 
“arts” and “science.”  Too often science, in 
prescribing its approach and methods, diminishes 
and straitjackets the arts.  This is illustrated by 
McNiff’s (1998) approach to research in art 
therapy.   He shows how the application of 
“scientific method” has the effect of distancing 
students from the very questions that they want to 
answer.  He attributes this to the suppression of 
the creative aspects of experience within 
scientific practice and recognizes that, whereas 
this may be useful in some fields of investigation, 
in art therapy it is self-defeating.  He comments 
that 
One of the most enduring themes in 
science and philosophy is the tension 
between what can and cannot be 
known and expressed.  I believe that 
this gap is the most creative energy of 
the human spirit ...  Creative arts 
therapy is engaged with both aspects of 
experience, and this clearly 
distinguishes our practice from 
disciplines which base themselves on 
totally predictable outcomes.  ... I 
recognize the value of science and its 
research methods: but they can never 
encapsulate the totality of what I do 
(McNiff, 1998, p. 31).  
 
In developing a new form of art-based research, 
McNiff articulates a distinctive epistemological 
mode for art therapy research within which the 
empirical and creative gestures are in balance.  
This does justice to the needs and experience of 
art therapists, but also allows for the development 
of consensual knowledge. 
Facing up to Unformulated Experience in the 
Consciousness Studies Field 
I have argued in this paper that contributions to 
debates and discussions about the nature of mind 
and consciousness will be influenced as much by 
unformulated aspects of participants’ experience 
as by formulated ones.  These unformulated 
aspects are encoded in implicational cognitive 
systems whose content does not necessarily find 
articulate representation in words.  Implicational 
cognition is founded on information gained 
through a wide range of life experiences which 
has been synthesised into schematic meaning 
frameworks, and individuals differ in the range of 
experiences that have contributed to this process.  
However, a more important contributor to these 
individual differences is the fact that there is not 
a single mode of experiencing that is the basis for 
implicational cognition.   Information processing 
is determined by underlying factors which we are 
still not easily able to define, and which have 
been addressed in this paper using a range of 
terms from the literature: states of consciousness 
or being or modes of experiencing, for example. 
In the case of propositional and empirical 
knowledge, it has been possible to operationalize 
procedures for ensuring that the truth value of 
findings can be consensually negotiated.  This 
has been achieved through the systematic 
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application of rationality and procedures for 
detached and replicable observation.  However, it 
is not easy to reach consensus in the development 
of such procedures for implicational knowing, a 
problem exacerbated by the fact that practitioners 
of different disciplines cultivate and stabilize a 
range of distinctive modes of experiencing, and 
articulate these in distinctive discourses.  One 
solution to this dilemma is to deal exclusively 
with propositional knowing and as far as possible 
diminish the significance of implicational 
knowing.  This is the route taken by “science”.  
In the “arts”, by contrast, the limitations of 
propositional knowing are recognized and 
implicational cognition is acknowledged as 
fundamental to any complete account. 
In conclusion, therefore, it is not possible to free 
our discussions about the nature and implications 
of consciousness from the subtle and not so 
subtle effects of the modes of experiencing of the 
participants. These may have been shaped by 
experiences of personal significance which have 
been acknowledged and reflected on, but are also 
inevitably shaped by experience that is, as yet, 
unformulated.  This includes dissociated aspects 
that have been unconsciously split off because of 
inter alia (i) trauma, (ii) routine everyday 
separation of modes of consciousness in which 
the significance of experiences in one mode of 
experiencing is simply disavowed when in 
another, and (iii) creative possibilities which are 
emergent and as yet unrealized.  These creative 
possibilities may themselves involve such 
radically different modes of apprehension that 
they are often conceptualized as altered states of 
consciousness.  Concepts like implicational 
cognition, unformulated experience and state-
specific sciences provide a means of addressing 
the problems posed for academic discourse by 
the diversity of human experience.  However, 
until we can develop a more coherent 
understanding of this and reach some consensus 
about it, we can expect that there will be many 
occasions when participants will simply speak at 
cross-purposes and the age old debates will 
remain unresolved. 
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